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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EViDENCE-DECLARATION

OBTAINED BY USE OF A HDDEN

MiCROParoNE ADmSSiBLE.-Defendant was convicted of conspiring to sell opium and
of making an illegal sale of opium. A substantial part of the evidence which led to
his conviction was adduced as a result of the testimony of a federal agent as to certain
damaging and prejudicial admissions made by the defendant to a paid Government
informer. The informer, wired for sound, engaged the defendant, an old acquaintance,
in an incriminating conversation within the defendant's business establishment. The
agent audited the conversation by means of a receiving set tuned to the microphone
hidden on the person of the informer. On appeal, from the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, four justices dissenting, held, conviction affirmed. The acquisition of
the evidence was constitutional and the evidence was admissible. On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
The problem presented in the instant case is whether the acquisition of evidence
by the use of the concealed radio set within the close of the defendant is in violation
of the Fourth Amendment' as an unreasonable search or seizure. If it is violative
then the evidence obtained would be inadmissible in the federal forum since it wai
procured by a federal agent.2 This exclusionary rule, though contrary to the common
laws and that of a majority of the states, 4 is said to be the only effective means of
carrying out the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.5 This amendment is a limitation
on the Federal Government's authority to infringe upon the personal privacy of
citizensO and guarantees freedom from both unlawful searches and seizures.7 Searches
which are exploratory in nature are prohibited. 8 It had been held by the Court of
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. Co.s. Aaxram. IV.
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The rule adopted by the Boyd case was
repudiated in 1904 by Adams v. New York, 192 US. 585 (1904). The Supreme Court from
what Wigmore terms "misplaced sentimentality" (VIII WxmoRr, E%7=EzmCE 31 (3d ed.
1940)), returned to the Boyd doctrine in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Since
then the rule has been extended to include all evidence procured through the use of knowledge
gained from that which was illegally acquired. Nardone et al. v. United States, 303 US. 338
(1939). But evidence obtained by anyone other than a federal agent unconstitutionally is
held to be admissible in the federal courts. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
3. Olmstead et al. v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467 (1928).
4. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
5. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 11So
F. 2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
6. United States v. Lefkowitz et a., 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Atkinson, Admissibility ol
Evidence Obtained, 25 COL. L. Rav. 11, 17 (1925). In Fraternal Order of Eagles, et al. v.
United States, 57 F. 2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1932), the court said, "This right is so sacred and
fundamental that it was determined to implant it in our institutions in the fullness of its
integrity by making it a part of the Constitution, free from the possibility of legislative
change."
7. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (concurring opinion of Miller, S.).
8. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Federal Trade Commission v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Entick v. Carrington, et a!., 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
95
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Appeals in reliance upon a prior decision of the Supreme Court,0 that the thing
searched for or seized must be something tangible or material.' 0 The dissenting opinion
in that court had relied upon Nueslein v. District of Columbia1 ' which holds that a
declaration made during an illegal search is inadmissible. The Supreme Court, while
not holding that an intangible might not be the subject of an illegal search, maintained
that unlawful seizures of tangibles might occur where the entry is by subterfuge or
fraud rather than by force.' 2 However, the Court holds these decisions inapposite in
the field of mechanical or electronic devices designed to overhear or intercept conversations where the listening post was not obtained by illegal means. The Court here finds
no entry or trespass and considers the transmitter and receiver equivalent to the use
of field glasses or bifocals to magnify vision in focusing on someone's private indiscretions.13 Of course the analogy limps inasmuch as the transmitter and receiver would
be valueless without the presence of the microphone which did enter the room.
The entry of the agent into petitioner's close carrying the microphone was held to
be lawful and his subsequent use of the microphone was held not to constitute him a
trespasser ab initio.'4 The Court termed the argument that the agent outside had
trespassed as verging on the "frivolous" and conditioned inadmissibility on an actual
physical entry. Mr. Justice Burton in dissent stated that the presence of the transmitter
was in effect the presence of the ear of the agent outside. The attempt to conform to
prior cases of a less scientific age is concededly difficult.
In Goldman v. United States,15 federal agents trespassed unsuccessfully to install a
dictaphone and then resorted to the use of a detectaphone attached to the outside of
the wall. The Court held the evidence gathered by the detectapbone admissible on
the ground that, in the absence of any trespass in the installation of the device, there
was no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. In dicta the Court indicated
that any evidence obtained by use of the dictaphone might be held inadmissible since
the trespass would have been the concomitant of the use of the apparatus. Similarly
in Olmstead v. United States,'6 Chief Justice Taft, in holding wire-tapping outside the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, continually adverted to the fact that there was no
trespass committed in the wire-tapping process.' 7 It is to be noted that in all cases
holding the evidence admissible no trespass had been committed. This distinction seems

'

9. United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951).
10. Olmstead et al. v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11. 115 F. 2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Evidence obtained by reading, copying or photographing after an illegal search is similarly inadmissible. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624
(1946) ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. et al. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
12. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952). It is interesting to note that the
Court of Appeals in the instant case rejects the doctrine of the Nueslein case while holding
that the evidence must be of a tangible nature. In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) the Supreme Court cites the Nueslein case with approval as one where federal officers
enter premises illegally and seized evidence of a crime.
13. The use of a detectaphone (Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); a
searchlight beam (United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Safarik v. United States,
62 F. 2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933), rehearing denied, 63 F. 2d 369)) ; or peeking through a transom
(McDonald et al. v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948)), is said to be permissible.
14. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 9.
(1927).
15. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Id. at 457, 464, 465, 466.
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to be the dividing line as to whether the search is illegal or not. It is submitted that
a reasonable basis exists herein upon which a trespass can be found. The defendant
surely could not be said to have consented to the presence of the microphone for
purposes of transmitting his conversation out to the agent. Had the agent pushed the
microphone into the room with a pole or thrown it in through the window he would
have committed a trespass.' s The distinction between that and placing the microphone
upon a person who entered the room is one without a difference. In both cases the
presence of the microphone is not consented to, and the desired objective is achieved.
In the crime of burglary the mere protrusion of an object used in the crime constitutes
an entry even though no part of the body invaded the close. 10 In fact there was here
an unwarranted invasion of the close of the defendant by the law, which should be
sufficient reason to exclude the evidence procured thereby under the Fourth Amendment.
It is submitted that the Court in the instant case, in determining atconstitutional
question which should be decided liberally and in favor of the defendant, ° entertains
fine and pretty distinctions. The right of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment
was closely guarded by the makers of our Constitution 2 and for the Supreme Court
to give sanction to the methods used by the government in the instant case is to make
the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unlawful search and seizure vulnerable
to the advance of more reprehensible methods of crime detection.22

CORPOCRATIONS--STocxHoLDERs'
ACTIONS-REQUIREMENT THAT PLAI;Tirp GVE
SECURITY FOR EXPENSEs-ACTION TO COMPEL DECLARATION Or DIvME-.-Plain-

tiff stockholder brought suit against defendant corporation and its directors to
compel the declaration of a dividend. Plaintiff's holdings aggregated less than
five per cent of the outstanding stock of defendant corporation and had a market
value of under $50,000 and, accordingly, defendant corporation moved under New
York General Corporation Law Section 61 (b) to require plaintiff to provide security
for costs. Plaintiff resisted on the basis that this statute applies only to suits brought
in the right of the corporation, and that the instant action was brought in the right
of the stockholders. The corporate defendant's motion was granted at Special Term.
On appeal, one justice dissenting, held, affirmed. A suit to compel the declaration
of a dividend is a suit against directors brought in the right of the corporation
and is therefore a proper subject for a motion for security under Section 61 (b).
Gordon v. Elliman, 280 App. Div. 655, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 671 (1st Dep't 1952).
18. 1 RESTATE ,wT, Toars §§ 158, 168 (1934).
19. State v. Crawford, 8 NJ). 539, 80 N.W. 193 (1899).
20. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124
(1932); United States v. Lefkowitz et al., 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
21. See note 6 supra.
22. "The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of a long misuse of power in the
matter of searches and seizures . . .[The Court here is referring to the oppressive General
Warrants of England, the lettres de cachet, and writs of astance which prompted James
Oatis to make his immortal speech and commenced the long course of repression that ended
in the American Revolution] and the assurances against any revival of it so carefully embodied in the fundamental law, is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal
methods which, regarded superficially may seem to escape the challenge of illegality but
which in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right." Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (Emphasis added).
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The issue in the instant case is whether a stockholder's action to compel the
declaration of a dividend is a suit brought "in the right of" the corporation, within
the meaning of Section 61 (b) of the General Corporation Law.1 In Swinton et al.
v. W. J. Bush & Co.,2 the sole decision precisely in point prior to the decision in
the instant case, it was held that such an action was not brought in the right of
the corporation, but in the personal right of the plaintiff stockholder and those
of plaintiff's class. Accordingly, it was held the corporation was not entitled
to security for costs.
Prior to the enactment of this statute, it was necessary, in two classes of cases,
to determine whether such an action was brought in the right of the corporation: (1)
when the plaintiff stockholder had not made demand for suit within the corporation
prior to instituting the action; (2) when plaintiff stockholder sued the corporation
but did not join the directors as defendants. In each of these situations if the suit
was held to be brought in the right of the corporation, the action would be dismissed.
In the first situation, authority is limited and conflicting 8 In the second, the
1. "In any action instituted in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation by
the holder or holders of less than five per centum of the outstanding shares . . . unless
the shares . ..have a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars, the corporation
in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled . . . to require the plaintiff . . .to
give security .. ." N.Y. GEs. Coaps. LAw § 61 (b) (italics supplied). If the action Is not
brought in the right of the corporation, the statute does not apply. Lennan v. Blakeley,
80 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Schrieber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp.
106 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In the federal courts, even if the action is not In the right
of the corporation, it is necessary that plaintiff's stock holdings aggregate at least $3,000
(the federal jurisdictional amount) since invariably the basis of federal jurisdiction
will be diversity of citizenship. Ames v. Mengel Co. et al., 190 F. 2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951).
See Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957 (D.C. Del. 1949). That Section 61 (b) must be recognized and applied in a proper federal case, see 14 Fo,. L. REV.
229 (1945), and Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 6 (1949).
The following actions have been held to have been brought in the right of the stockholders (so-called "representative" suits): (1) Action to set aside corporate lease as
invalid under statute providing such lease require approval by stockholders to be valid.
(Corporation estopped from bringing action because it had accepted benefits.) Held,
primary right to bring action in stockholders. Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98
F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Cf. Selman v. Allen, 129 N.Y.L.J. 732, col. 8 (Sup. Ct.
March 5, 1953). (2) Corporate charter required two-thirds consent of stockholders as prerequisite to issuance of new stock. Corporation issued stock without such consent. Held,
stockholder's suit to enjoin issuance was in own right, not in right of corporation. Action
"representative," not "derivative." Ames v. Mengel Co. et al., 190 F. 2d 344 (2d Cir.
1951); (3) Action to restrain granting of stock options by corporation to executives
held "certainly not derivative." Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 55 F. Supp.
945 (E. D. Penn. 1944). See Kohler v. Humphrey et aI., 174 F. 2d 946 (5th Cir. 1949)
semble; Lochley v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E. 2d 895 (1950).
2. 199 Misc. 321, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 994 (Sup. Ct.), af'd on another point, 278 App.
Div. 754, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 1019 (1st Dep't 1951). Appeal was taken only on the holding
that directors were not necessary parties to suit. The denial of the motion for security
under Section 61 (b) was not appealed from. Transcript of Record, p. 2.
3. Suit dismissed unless demand made: Maeder v. Buffalo Bill's Wild West Co.,
132 Fed. 280 (D.N.J. 1904); N.Y. Pa. N.J. Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission
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weight of authority is that the action should not be dismissed despite the nonjoinder of directors-who are proper 4 but not indispensably necessary0 parties. In
New York, authority on this latter question is sparse and in apparent conflict. The
Appellate Division of the Third Department, in Jones v. Vani Hettsen Charles Co.16
held that a complaint in an action to compel declaration of dividend brought by
a stockholder against a corporation as sole defendant stated a cause of action.
Much language appears to the effect that such a suit is in the right of the corporation, and a suggestion (in the guise of a holding) is made that the directors be
joined on the trial. Much of the strong language in this case seems to be dicta, and
the authorities cited in support of the language are not in point.7
The opinion in the Van Heusen case was considered and rejected in Suinton et al. v.
W. I. Bush & Co.,3 in which it was held at Special Term that directors are not
necessary parties in a suit to compel the declaration of a dividend. The Appellate
Division of the First Department affirmed (without opinion) on this point,0 thereby
clashing with at least the language of the Third Department in the Van Heusen case.
In so doing, the First Department took the position that a stockholder may bring
a suit to compel the declaration of a dividend against the corporation as sole defendant. In the instant case, the same court held that such a suit is "essentially
a complaint against directors" brought by the stockholder in the right of the corporation.' 0 It is submitted that this appears inconsistent with the court's prior bolding
et al, 23 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) semble. See Wilson v. American Ice Co., 206
Fed. 736 (D. N.J. 1913). 11 FLErc..R, CycLoPEnr.IA op T LAW OF PRvIa'n Conrortuxo.s
§ 5326 (1927). Demand not necessary: In re Brantman, 244 Fed. 101 (2d Cir. 1917) (by
implication). See BA LA.aT,
LAW OF CoRnoRATioNs § 234 (1946).
4. See Davidoff v. Seidenberg et al., 275 App. Div. 784, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 5 (2d Dcp't 1949).
S. Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp. et al., 179 F. 2d 760 (3d Cir. 1950); Whittemore et al. v. Continental Mills et al., 98 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Me. 1951); Stevens v. US.
Steel Corp., 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 59 AUt. 905 (1905); Swinton et a. v. W. J. Bush &
Co., 199 Misc. 321, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 994 (Sup. Ct.), aiid, 278 App. Div. 754, 103 N.Y.S.
2d 1019 (1st Dep't 1951). See W. Q. O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall et al., 103 Ind. App. 116,
25 N.E. 2d 656 (1940). Contra: Schuckerman v. Rubenstein et al., 164 F. 2d 952 (6th
Cir. 1947); Marcuse v. Gullett Gin Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1383, 27 So. 846 (1900). See 61
Ea.Rv. L. Rav. 1253 (1943) criticising Schuckerinan case, supra. The rationale of the first
cited cases is that while dividend declaration usually is within the discretion of directors,
the result of a successful action to compel declaration is to render the corporation liable
for the amount determined, any action of directors then becoming ministerial.
6. 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204 (3d Dep't 1930).
7. Flynn v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 158 N.Y. 493, 53 N.E. 520 (1899) (suit to set

aside corporate lease); Niles v. New York Central &H.R.R.R. Co. et a., 176 N.Y. 119,
68 N.E. 142 (1903) (action for damages against directors for conspiracy to wreck corporation); Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 N.Y. 121, 73 N.E. 562 (190S) (action
against directors for misconduct); Godley v. Crandall & Goodley Co. et al, 212 N.Y.
121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914) (suit to compel directors to account for bogus salaries). Each

of these actions was obviously brought in the right of the corporation, and is not authority
for the proposition that a suit to compel the declaration of a dividend is brought
derivatively.
8. 199 Misc. 321, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
9. 278 App. Div. 754, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 1019 (Ist Dep't 1951); Transcript of Record,
p. 2. See note 2 supra.
10. 280 App. Div. 655, 659, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 671, 675 (1st Dep't 1952).
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in affirming Swinton et al. v. W. J. Bush & Co. If a suit to compel declaration of a dividend is "essentially a complaint against directors" it is not clear why the court did not
dismiss the complaint in Swinton et al. v. W. J. Bush & Co. for non-joinder of indispensable parties.
An action in which the corporation is sole defendant and against which relief
will be exclusively directed, it seems clear, is not a suit in the right of the corporation but is one hostile to it. In every law suit, there must be a real defendant.
In the Swinton case there were only two parties-plaintiff and the corporation. The
corporation was either a real or a nominal defendant. Clearly it was not a nominal
defendant for then the action would be without a real defendant. Therefore, the
corporation being a real defendant, the plaintiff's action was directed against it, and
was not derivative.
It seems patent that these two decisions by the same court are conflicting. It
remains to be determined which represents the better view.
The court, in holding that plaintiff's suit in the instant case is brought in the
right of the corporation, stresses what it considers "the identity of interest" between the corporation and the entire body of its stockholders.11 In this, it is submitted, the court erred. It is basic law that a corporation is an entity wholly
distinct from the body of its stockholders. 12 The interests of each are usually
but not always identical. The retention of surplus by the corporation for its unrestrained expansion instead of distributing it among the stockholders as dividends
might be beneficial to the corporation and still be burdensome to the stockholders. 1
When the latter sue the corporation to compel distribution, it seems clear they do so
hostilely and not derivatively,' 4 and at such point the conception of the corporation as a separate entity becomes a reality instead of a fiction. In some situations
the corporation may benefit by the distribution of dividends to its stockholders,1
and, because of the current federal surtax on undistributed surplus, 10 this may be
true in the instant case. 17 It is submitted, however, that the interjection of this
accidental element of incidental gain to the corporation does not alter the essentially
11. "There is no divergence of interest between a corporation and the entire body
of its stockholders in any matter. Their interests are identical. . . . What is good for
the one is good for the other and what is bad for the one is bad for the other because of the identity of actual interest." 280 App. Div. 655, 658, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 671,
674 (1st Dep't 1952).

12. Werner v. Hearst, 177 N.Y. 63, 69 N.E. 221 (1903); VanCleave v. Demprest,
See 1 FLETCIIER, CYCLOPEDIA OP

174 App. Div. 928, 160 N.Y. Supp. 923 (2d Dep't 1916).
TE

LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 24 (1931).

13. The most striking demonstration of this is found in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204
See also Stevens v. U.S. Steel Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 373,
Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
59 At. 905 (1905) and Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl.

941 (1905).

See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustces?,

45 HARv. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1932).
14. In re Brantman, 244 Fed. 101 (2d Cir. 1917). See Raynolds v. Diamond Mills
Paper Co., supra note 13; BALLANTmnE, LAW or ConPsoRAioNs § 234 (1946).
15. Lydia E. Pinkham. Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E. 2d 482 (1939)
(corporation proper party plaintiff in suit against its directors to compel declaration of
dividend).
16. 52 STAT. 483, 26 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1938).
17. Plaintiff so alleged.
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hostile character of the action brought against (not in the right of) the corporation
as an actual defendant. 18
An action brobght by a stockholder to compel the declaration of a dividend not
being "in the right of" the corporation, is not therefore within Section 61 (b),20
and defendant's motion should have been denied. The majority of the court in the
instant case suggests notwithstanding, that a suit to compel the declaration of a
dividend "falls within the class of actions in which the Legislature intended to require security." 20 However, if the legislature so intended, it did not express its
intention in the words and phrases of Section 61 (b), which is expressly limited to
suits "brought in the right of any . . corporation."
The court in the instant case, by judicial legislation, has broadened the ambit
of a highly controversial statute.2 1 It is submitted that this is an undertaking
to be exercised, if at all, by the legislature.

CRIMNAL LAW-NECESSITY OF AN INFORMATION-FORMAL INFORA.xfTION NOT A
REQUISITE TO JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER WHERE DEFENDA2NT SUBMITS
ArFmAVIT OF FACTS AND PLEADS GuiLTY.-Defendant was convicted of disorderly

conduct. He had voluntarily surrendered to the police, and composed an affidavit
confessing certain acts. Subsequently, defendant, his father, his clergyman, representatives of the police department and the city attorney conferred and agreed that defendant should be charged with violation of the catch-all Section 43 of the New York
Penal Law, which is a misdemeanor. Thereupon defendant voluntarily appeared
before the Coming City Court, without counsel, and pleaded guilty to that charge.
No information or other formal accusation ever having been filed against him, the
defendant appealed on the ground that the Coming City Court never had jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of the offense and that therefore his conviction was a nullity.
18. See Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y. Supp. 172 (2d Dep't
1933). In Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., supra note 1, where an action was
brought by stockholder to set aside a corporate lease (invalid under statute requiring
stockholder consent for such leases), the corporation was estopped to bring suit because
it had received the benefits of the lease. Despite the benefits that would redound to
the corporation if the stockholder were successful, the court held the suit not one brought
in the right of the corporation, and denied a motion by the corporation that plaintiff
provide security for costs under Section 61 (b). Cf. Selman v. Allen, 129 N.Y.LJ. 732,
col. 8 (Sup. Ct. March 5, 1953), in which suit by stockholder to enjoin officers from
exercising options to buy issued stock was held to be in the right of the corporation,
and a motion for security under Section 61 (b) was granted. The Schreiber case (supra)
was approved but distinguished. The court noted "it is possible . . . for the same facts
to constitute a wrong to the corporation and also to the individual stockholders so that
a stockholder may elect whether to sue in the right of the corporation for the wrong
done it or in his own right for the wrong done to him . .. [unless] the wrong alleged
is a wrong to the corporation only." Id. at 733.
19. See cases cited in note 1 supra.
20. 280 App. Div. 655, 660, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 671, 676 (1st Dep't 1952). To this proposition Callahan, J., dissented.
21. For a strong criticism of § 61 (b) see George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CAra. L. REv. 123 (1944).
Cf. 52
CoL. L. REv. 267 (1952).
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, three judges dissenting, held,
conviction affirmed. Defendant's affidavit was sufficient to constitute an information
giving the court jurisdiction. People v. Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33, 105 N.E. 2d 613,
cert. den., 344 U.S. 864 (1952).
A court cannot try a person for a criminal offense unless it has jurisdiction of both
the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the defendant. 1 It is well settled
that jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be conferred upon a court by consent
or waiver.2 In the instant case there is no question but that the Corning City Court
had jurisdiction of misdemeanor prosecutions 3 The issue here is whether or not the
defendant's affidavit amounted to an information sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court of the subject-matter of this prosecution.
The New York Code of Criminal Procedure 4 provides that all criminal actions in
the courts of Special Sessions in the City of New York must be prosecuted by
informations signed by the district attorney. Outside of New York City, as the New
York Supreme Court in People v. Bell5 noted, neither the New York Constitution nor
the Code of Criminal Procedure require the filing of a written information.
It is universally held that there can be no conviction or punishment for a crime
without a formal and sufficient accusation0 even though the accused voluntarily submits
to the jurisdiction of the court. 7 In Smith v. O'Grady,8 the United States Supreme
Court observed that notice to the accused of the true nature of the charge against him
is the first requirement of due process. It has been held that no consent or waiver
by the accused can confer jurisdiction upon a court or authorize the accused's
conviction in the absence of an accusation charging him with a violation of the
criminal law.0 However, a majority of the jurisdictions hold that it is not necessary
that an information be filed before a court can convict for a misdemeanor.10 The
reasoning is that the statutes or constitutions requiring informations create a personal
privilege which may be waived by the accused," and that unless such privilege is
asserted it will be deemed waived.' 2 In State v. Mee, 14 where the facts were strikingly
1. People v. Park, 92 Misc. 369, 156 N.Y. Supp. 816 (Erie County Ct. 1915); Singleton
v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 454, 208 S.W. 2d 325 (1948).
2. Harris v. State, 82 A. 2d 387 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951); State v. Mee, 67 S.D. 589, 297
N.W. 40 (1941).
3. New York Laws, c. 142, § 142.
4. N.Y. CODE Camr. Paoc. § 742.
5. 31 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 370, 148 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Montgomery County Ct. 1914).
6. Spence v. Dowd, 145 F. 2d 451 (7th Cir. 1944); State v. McKinley, 341 Mo. 1186,
111 S.W. 2d 115 (1937); Stewart et al. v. State, 41 Ohio App. 351, 181 N.E. 111 (1932);
Harry v. State, 59 Okla. Cr. 302, 58 P.2d 340 (1936).
7. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927) ; People v. Zolotoff, 48 Cal. App. 2d 360,
119 P.2d 745 (1942).
8. 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
9. People v. Fore, 384 111.
455, 51 N.E. 2d 548 (1943).
10. McKinstry v. Tuscaloosa, 172 Ala. 344, 54 So. 629 (1910); Singleton v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 454, 208 S.W. 2d 325 (1948); Geo. H. Goodman Co. v. Commonwealth,
30 Ky. L. Rep. 519, 99 S.W. 252 (1907); McGinnis v. State, 9 Humph. 43 (Tenn. 1848).
11. The concurring opinion in the instant case submits this theory. 304 N.Y. 33, 42, 105
N.E. 2d 613, 617 (1952). United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.C.N.M. 1931); Irwin v.
State, 220 Ind, 228, 41 N.E. 2d 809 (1942) ; State v. Mee, 67 S.D. 335, 292 N.W. 875 (1940).
12. Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917).
13. 67 S.D. 335, 292 N.W. 875 (1940), rev'd, 67 S.D. 589, 297 N.W. 40 (1941) on the
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similar to those in the instant case, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that
when the defendant voluntarily appeared before the court and pleaded guilty to a
complaint without waiting for the filing of an information, the requirement of an
information was waived.' 4
Under the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, it is not essential that criminal prosecutions be by indictment or information; each state may prescribe its own mode of judicial proceeding.15 The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the law as enforced by the state should afford equal protection to all within that jurisdiction and that it be not violative of the fundamental
rights essential to the protection of life, liberty or property.10
The New York Code of Criminal Procedure17 defines an information as an allegation
made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of some designated crime. The
purposes of an information are to inform the accused of the charge against him in
order that he may prepare for trial and to prevent him from being tried again for the
same offense.' 8 The majority of the court in the instant case concurs with the viev?
of the majority of the jurisdictions by holding that defendant's confession amounted
to a sufficient accusation and that since it satisfied the purposes of an information it
could be regarded as a substitute. The court further observed that since the defendant's
affidavit described the acts which constituted the offense, there was little chance that
he would be tried again for that same offense, and that also, since defendant himself
prepared the charge, it cannot be said that he was not prepared to try it.
In the instant case it appears that no accusation other than defendant's confession
was ever lodged against him, and that defendant, a youth of nineteen, appeared at his
trial without counsel. Relying on Albrecht v. United States,'0 the dissent contends
that while an information as far as it is necessary to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest may be dispensed with by the accused's voluntary appearance before the court,
such appearance does not eliminate the requirement that an information or some
other formal and sufficient accusation be lodged against him as a basis for proceeding
with the prosecution. - 0 It is submitted by the dissent that under our accusatorial
ground that an accused cannot confer jurisdiction of the subject-matter by his waiver, and
that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the offense. See note 2 supra.
14. In New York and in most of the other jurisdictions an indictment may not be
dispensed with in felony prosecutions. U.. Co;sr. AnXN-D. VI; Ex parle McClusky, 40 Fed.
71 (8th Cir. 1889); Singleton v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 4S4, 203 S.W. 2d 325 (1948);
N.Y. CozsT. Art. I, § 6; N.Y. CoDE Casar PRoc. § 274; People ex rel. Batista v. Christina,
249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928); Okla. CoxsT. Art. II, § 17; Bennett et al. v. State, 33
Okla. Cr. 244, 243 Pac. 531 (1926). However, an indictment in a felony prosecution may
be waived where the statute (Cook v. Weir, 185 Ga. 418, 195 S.E. 740 (1938); DeGolyer V.
Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 626, 51 N.E. 2d 251 (1943), or state constitution permits (Ore.
Coxsr. Art. VII, § 18; State v. Lillie, 172 Ore. 194, 138 P.2d 576 (1943); Irwin v. State,
220 Ind. 228, 41 N.E. 2d 809 (1942) where the court reached this result by interpreting
Ind. CONST. Art. I, § 13).
15. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883).
16. People v. Zolotoff, 48 Cal. App. 2d 360, 119 P. 2d 745 (1942).
17. N.Y. CODE C~aRn PROC. § 145.
18. People v. Belcher, 302 N.Y. 529, 99 N.E. 2d 874 (1951); People v. Schultz, 301 N.Y,
495, 95 N.E. 2d 815 (1950).
19. 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
20. In Post v. United States, 161 U.S. 583 (1896), the United States Supreme Court
held that criminal proceedings cannot be said to be brought or instituted until a formal
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system of criminal law 21 it cannot be said that defendant's confession was an adequate
substitute for such formal accusation. The dissent further argues that the confession
was inadequate even as an information since it failed to state acts sufficient to spell
out the commission of a crime, and that also, the statement did not charge a violation
of Section 43. However, it is undoubtedly the law of New York that defects in an
information may be waived.2
There are no Court of Appeals of New York decisions dealing directly with the
question of whether or not an information may be waived in New York. The view of
a majority of the lower court decisions on this question is that although a defendant
is entitled to a written information, he may waive such, and a plea of guilty amounts
24
to such waiver.as A contrary view is found in People ex rel. Sampson v. Dunning
where the Appellate Division held that a justice of the peace could have no jurisdiction
without the filing of an information which charged the accused with some designated
crime. The prevailing rule of the lower courts is cited and preferred by the majority
of the court in the instant case while the dissent places emphasis upon Section 699
of the Code of Criminal Procedure which requires that "the charge against the debe read to the
fendant be distinctly read to him." It has been held that the 2charge
6
accused from the information or the warrant on some record.
Actually the facts of the instant case involve the commission of certain lewd acts
on the part of the defendant. In an effort apparently to reduce the embarrassment to
the defendant and to save him from more serious consequences because of his youth
and previous good conduct, he was allowed to plead guilty to a misdemeaftor under
Section 43 of the Penal Law, so that the absence of any information was not in any
sense unfair or unjust. The right to a formal accusation in a misdemeanor prosecution
was recognized early in the English law 26 and in the law of the American Colonies. 27
In view of the current world situation where criminal procedure in many countries
has been made a farce, we should guard our ancient rights more jealously. The danger
charge is openly made against the accused and that a person is charged with a crime only
when he is called upon in legal proceedings to answer such charge.
21. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
22. People v. Brous, 296 N.Y. 1028, 73 N.E. 2d 905 (1947). Cf. N.Y. ConE CRmx PRoc.
§§ 684 and 764 which are to the effect that where a lower court has disregarded pure
formalities or has made non-prejudicial omissions, they are to be disregarded by the
appellate court. These sections have been held to apply to defects in informations. People
v. Radaha 69 N.Y.S. 2d 722 (Rockland County Ct. 1947). To same effect, see Kyser v. State,
22 Ala. App. 437, 117 So. 157, cert. den., 217 Ala. 561, 117 So. 159 (1928). In an action
originally brought in the City of New York it was held that the information could not be
supplemented or pieced out by affidavits in Magistrate's Court. People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y.
138, 183 N.E. 273 (1932).
23. People v. Park, 92 Misc. 369, 156 N.Y. Supp. 816 (Erie County Ct. 1915); People

v. Bums, 19 Misc. 680, 44 N.Y. Supp. 1106 (Onondaga County Ct. 1897); People v
Carter, 88 Hun. 304, 34 N. Y. Supp. 764 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
24. 113 App. Div. 35, 98 N.Y. Supp. 1067 (2d Dep't 1906). Cf. People v. Bell, 31 N.Y.
Crim. Rep. 370, 148 N. Y. Supp. 753 (Montgomery County Ct. 1914); People v. James,
11 App. Div. 609, 43 N.Y. Supp. 315 (4th Dep't 1896).
25. People ex rel. Baker v. Beatty, 39 Hun 476, 4 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 287 (Sup. Ct. 1886).
26. BLACKSTONE, COrmENTARiES ON THE. LAW 881 (Gavit ed. 1941).
27. See Weeks v. United States, 216 Fed. 292 (2d Cir. 1914) and State v. Gerry, 68 N.H.
495, 38 AtI. 272 (1896), where the courts discuss misdemeanor prosecution during colonlat
times.
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that the rule of the instant case may be applied or extended without reference to the
actual facts thereof is evident. The decision of the majority should be strictly confined
to its facts.

TAXATION-GIFT TAx-ExTRinsIc CIRCUMSTANCES OPERATED TO CONSTITUTE A
TRUST FOR A MINOR A FUTURE INTEREST.-Petitioner created three irrevocable trusts,
identical in all respects save for the named beneficiaries who were his three minor
children. Each trust was to terminate when the named beneficiary reached the age of
twenty-one and during minority the trustee had the right to pay the trust income to
the mother or guardian for the use of the minor. The beneficiary, however, had the
right, which during minority could be exercised by its guardian if one were appointed,
at any time to terminate the trust either in whole or in part. No guardian was ever
appointed. In his gift tax return, petitioner claimed $3,000 exemption for each trust.
The Tax Court ruled that the gift was fully taxable on the ground that the petitioner's
intent as shown by the instrument and surrounding circumstances was to create a
future interest. 'On appeal, held, judgment affirmed. The transfer made was one of a
future interest not subject to immediate capture. Arthur C. Slifel v. Commissioner,
197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
Under Section 1003(b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code,' gifts, except those of a
future interest, are exempt from gift tax to the extent of the first $3,000 given to each
donee in any one taxable year. The determination of the nature of the interest passed
is the prime consideration in deciding whether a gift is entitled to the annual exclusion.
Future interests are defined in the regulations 2 to include those interests the use,
possession or enjoyment of which is postponed to a later time.
The barrier to present enjoyment may be inherent in the type of interest conveyed.
In Commissioner v. Brandegee,3 it was held that a remainderman's interest was of
necessity a future interest because his enjoyment was postponed during the existence
of the life estate. Most frequently, however, enjoyment or use is deferred when the
gift is made in trust because of the peculiar limitations and contingencies that the
terms of the trust instrument impose on the beneficiary's interest.
Even though the corpus is a future interest the income thereon can be a present
interest. 4 However the taxpayer's assertion that income of a gift in trust to a minor
is a transfer of a present interest is not easily established. The tax gatherer is alert.
Fatal barriers to the right of present use of income have taken the form of provisions
directing an accumulation of income until the beneficiaries attain majority notvithstanding a power to invade the accumulations if necessary0 or a provision empowering
the trustee in his sole discretion to determine the time of payment. 7 The insertion
in the trust instrument of a contingency of survival has likewise precluded exclusion8
1. "Gifts after 1942-In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year 1943 and subsequent calendar
years, the first
$3,OD0 of such gifts to such persons shall not, for the purposes of subsection
(a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year."
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.11.
3. 123 F. 2d 58 (1st Cir. 1941).
4. Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
5. Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945).
6. Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 US. 18 (1945).
7. Helvering v. Blair, 121 F. 2d 945 (2d Cir. 1941).
8.

United States v. Pelzer, 312 US. 399 (1941).
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Rare indeed are the cases holding against the Commissioner's contentions that the
incomes of gifts in trust are future interests. Notable among these cases is Commismissioner v. Lowden.9 There the trustee was simply to distribute annually the income
accumulated from the fund to the settlor's children or their descendants per stirpes.
The Commissioner objected that the amount to be taken was rendered uncertain
because of the probability of a beneficiary dying before the expiration of the year.
The court held otherwise and noted that an absence of an accurate appraisal of the
amount of income to be expected would not render a present right future.10
Commissioner v. Sharp" brought before the court a trust providing for present
payments, of income to any one of three persons on behalf of the minor beneficiary.
The court held that discretion as to whom payment was to be made was not a barrier
to present enjoyment.
Even more difficulties beset the settlor who claims exclusion of the corpus of a gift
in trust to a minor. It has been held that there is no valid distinction between gifts
in trust to infants and similar gifts to adults. 12 The decisions and commentators
indicate otherwise.' 3 Where a power of invasion is given to a minor beneficiary, his
ability to so invade is sharply limited by the legal impedimenta of infancy. In Fondren
et al. v. Commissioner14 the settlor had established three trusts for infant beneficiaries.
It was provided in the trust instrument that the trustee could invade the corpus or
accumulated income if necessary for the support, maintenance and education of the
infants. The amount of the trust income however would not be sufficient for the
immediate achievement of these purposes but the financial situation of the beneficiaries'
parents made any invasion unlikely. The Court held the amount of the corpus a nonexcludible future estate. There was a barrier of a substantial period between the will
of the beneficiaries to enjoy the gift and the actual enjoyment thereof in that such
enjoyment was contingent upon the improbable existence of a need. The Court seemed
not persuaded that the settlor had intended to make a present gift.
The instant case is not unlike three prior decisions which appear to be the only
cases wherein the corpus of a gift in trust to a minor beneficiary was held to be a
present interest. The first of these, Strekalovsky v. DelaneyC involved a trust for
the settlor's minor children with their father as trustee. The beneficiaries had a power
of invasion to be exercised through any legally appointed guardian. The trustee was
to act as if he were the guardian in determining the needs of the children and in
paying them their shares according to said needs. The court held that the right to a
present use of the fund which could be exercised through a guardian was a provision
for an immediate application of the corpus and hence a present interest. The provisions
for distribution by the trustee as if he were guardian gave rise to a finding of an
intention in the settlor to transfer a present interest. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner1"
followed. There the settlor created a trust for his three weeks old grandson. The
9. 131 F. 2d 127 (7th Cir. 1942).
10. But see Evans v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 206, aff'd, 198 F. 2d 435 (3d Cir. 1992),
holding that an absolute power in the trustee to invade the corpus renders the Income
incapable of present determination and consequently non-excludable.
11. 153 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir. 1946).
12. Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
13. See Rodgers, Some PracticalConsiderationsIn Gifts Ta Minors, 20 FoR. L. REV. 233,
261 (1951); Fleming, Gifts For The Benefit of Minors, 49 Mxci. L. REv. 529 (1951).
14. 324 U. S. 18 (1945).
15. 78 F. Supp. 556 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
16. 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
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trustee was to apply as much of the income and principal of the trust as was necessary
for the education and support of the infant. The entire remainder was to be paid
over to the beneficiary upon his attaining majority. The beneficiary's father was
financially able to care for the infant's needs. Despite the improbability of any invasion
by the beneficiary the court held the gift to be one of present interest. It was
reasoned that the terms of the trust instrument presented no barrier to present enjoyment. The court felt that by examining surrounding circumstances to ascertain the
intent of the settlor they would make anything less than an outright gift to a minor
a transfer of a future interest. Citing and following the Kiechhefer and Stre lotsky
decisions is the case of Canwi v. Robertson. 17 There the trust instrument provided
that the net income of the fund was to be applied for the benefit of the minor.
It was further provided that the corpus could be at any time distributed for his
support, maintenance, and education as approved and directed by a court having
jurisdiction. The court held the corpus to be a gift of a present interest. The
provision calling for application to and approval of a court having jurisdiction was not
considered a substantial barrier to present enjoyment.
The instant case would appear to be similar to the foregoing cases and in particular
to the Kieckhefer case; yet the exclusion was denied. Refusing to follow the lead
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit' s and to be bound by the form of
the trust instrument, the court here reached its decision by reference to extrinsic facts.
It was found that the financial condition of the donor, the fact that no guardian had
been appointed and that no such appointment was ever contemplated rendered improbable any present enjoyment of the corpus by the donee and indicated an intention
to make a future gift. Despite the suggestion of Judge Frank that the result would
have been otherwise had a guardian been appointed, it is submitted that the principal
case represents a return to the principle of determining tax liability on the basis of
substance rather than form. Donors would do well to take notice of the warning
implicit in the instant decision and seek a less vulnerable vehicle for their gifts to
minors.

TAxATIoN-INco
TAX-IDINECT MEDICAL EXPENSES No.N-DEDucrmLE.Petitioner's wife underwent an operation due to an ailment which was diagnosed as a
possible fatal throat cancer. During 1946 she was unable to speak above a whisper
and any effort to do so left her in a highly nervous state. The wife's suffering and
nervousness were caused in a great part by her two children aged four and six. Upon
a physician's advice and with the purpose of alleviating his wife's condition, the
petitioner separated the children from her by sending them to a boarding school.
The cost of the school was $1456.50, which sum the petitioner used as a basis for a
deduction from his income for the year of 1946 as a medical expense under Section
23(x) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court determined a deficiency and
taxpayer filed a petition for review. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, held,
order affirmed. The expenses were not deductible as medical expenses but were nondeductible family expenses. Samuel Oclks v. Comnissiotwr, 195 F. 2d 692 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827 (1952).
Prior to October 21, 1942, all medical expenses were treated as personal expenses
and the deduction thereof was prohibited by Section 24 (a) (1) of the Revenue Act
17.
18.

98 F. Supp. 331 (W.D.N.C. 1951).
". . . if the reversal in the Kieckhefer case is in point, then, with all due respect,

we decline to follow it." Stifel v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 647 (1951).
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of 1938.1 Consequently the question in the instant case was unlitigated as of October,
1942.2 The addition of Section 23 (x) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction based on expenses for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse or dependent,
which includes amounts paid for the "diagnosis, care, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body." Section 23 (x) necessarily conflicted with Section 24 (a) (1), requiring an
amendment of the latter section to exclude from personal expenses extraordinary
medical expenses deductible under Section 23 (x).a
The criterion of deductibility under Section 23 (x) is not that the expense was
incurred at the direction of a physician, 4 nor that expenditures were incurred for the
mere physical comfort of the taxpayer, his spouse or dependent. Usually when
alleged deductions for medical expenses are disallowed, the petitioner has not proved
that the expenses were incurred primarily to alleviate or prevent illness.5 In John L.
Seymour v. Commissioner,6 the expense of installing an oil burner was held nondeductible notwithstanding the fact that it was installed pursuant to a physician's
recommendation. Expenses incurred ostensibly for reasons of health but in reality for
vacation purposes are clearly without the scope of the statute.1 Moneys paid to a
nurse to care for an infant whose mother died in childbirth, the child being normal
and well, were held not to be a deductible item.8 The courts seek to determine
whether the expenses were necessary, reasonable and direct before the deduction of
such items is sanctioned.9
Petitioner's case is one of first impression. Heretofore deductible expenses benefited
the taxpayer, his spouse or dependent directly while the instant case presents a situation where the expenses were incurred indirectly though, concededly, primarily for the
wife's benefit. A factual situation somewhat analogous to the instant case is found in
those decisions holding deductible traveling expenses incurred primarily for and
essential to the rendition of medical expenses or to the prevention and/or alleviation
of physical or mental defects or illnesses. Such a situation was before the court in
Commissioner v. Stringham' where petitioner's infant daughter, a victim of various
respiratory ailments, was sent to Arizona and enrolled there in a private school. The
expenses incurred in the transportation to, and the maintenance of petitioner's
1. Revenue Act of 1938, § 24(a) (1), provides: "(a) General rule-In computing net
income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of-(1) Personal, living, or
family expenses."
2. A provision allowing the deduction of medical expenses was drafted by the Senate
Finance Committee and enacted as Section 127 (a) of the 1942 Revenue Act, amending the
Internal Revenue Code by adding Section 23 (x).
3. INT. REv. CODE § 24 (a) (1) now makes non-deductible "personal, living or family
expenses, except extraordinary medical expenses deductible under 23 (x)."
4. John L. Seymour v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950); Havey v. Commissioner,
12 T.C. 409, 411 (1949).
5. Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 886 (1950).
6. 14 T.C. 1111 (1950).
7. Herman A. Brody v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo op., Dkt. 16406 (1949).
8. George B. Wendell v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 161 (1949).
9. Charles Goodman et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo op., Dkt. 14238 (1950)
(If the taxpayer is reimbursed in whole by insurance moneys the deduction is not allowed
and if partial reimbursement has been made such allowance must be computed to lessen
deduction).
10. 183 F. 2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950).
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daughter, at school, exclusive of expenses attributable to her education, were held to
be deductible.
The majority of the court in the instant case seems to have reached its conclusion
that the expense of boarding the children was a family rather than a medical expense
on the ground that the benefit to the wife was indirect. The test of direct benefit
would not appear to be wholly adequate. Therapeutic measures need not necessarily
be direct to be effective and often what cannot be achieved directly is capable of
obtainment indirectly. Furthermore the Bureau has ruled that reasonable expenses
incurred for travel, meals and lodging by the parent while accompanying a sick child
to a sanatorium are deductible. 1' Such expenses seem as indirect as those in the
principal case.
Judge Frank's dissenting opinion is persuasive. Inconsistency is seen in the allowance of expenses incurred if the wife be sent to a sanatorium but disallowance where
the money expended for the children's board away from home, although admittedly
each item has the identical purpose: its curative effect upon the wife. His approach
to the problem is succinctly stated in the words, "the cure ought to be the doctor's
business, not the Commissioner's."' 12
In Havey v. Commissioner,13 the Tax Court purported to enunciate certain rules
for the determination of deductible medical expenses. Ample consideration should
be afforded the petitioner's purpose, the origin of the expense, i.e., whether or not
it was incurred at the direction of a physician, the relation of the treatment and the
illness as regards its efficaciousness, and the proximity in point of time between the
treatment and the ailment so as to constitute specific treatment as distinguished from
aid to general health. Tested by these sound and rational requirements the holding of
the instant case appears to be questionable. The fears of the majority that relaxation
of stringent standards would invite wholesale exemptions are plausible but not overwhelmingly so. The courts may still control, a reasonable standard may be set and
a practical solution afforded by a wise appraisal of circumstances surrounding such
expenditures.
11. I.T. 3786, 1946-1 Cuir BuL. 75.
12. Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F. 2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1952).
13.

12 T.C. 409 (1949).

